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Purpose: This paper investigates possible modalities of new EU-wide mandatory human 
rights due diligence (mHRDD) measures and their implications for the practice of corporate 
risk management. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: The contribution originates in a desk-based review and 
analysis of the EU policy debate and other relevant scholarly and stakeholder contributions. 
The applied research methodology includes a combination of theoretical and analytical 
methods. 
Findings: Businesses’ input pointing out the specificities of branches and suggesting best 
practices for implementing HRDD obligations is highly relevant for framing upcoming 
legislation. Proper fulfillment of HRDD obligations will, however, be definitively ascertained 
in court only. Compliance-oriented risk management accounting solely for the risks to the 
company may thus prove insufficient regarding HRDD and eventually lead to liability. 
Practical Implications: Given expectations of high corporate due diligence standards by 
investors, consumers and civil society on the one hand, and the prospective new EU HRDD 
measures on the other, it appears desirable for companies to take appropriate steps so as to 
adapt their business structures and operations for the endorsement of such new HRDD 
standards. 
Originality/Value: The contribution provides insights into mHRDD as a prospective new 
legal standard of care for companies operating on the EU Internal Market. 
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Developments have intensified across Europe to introduce mandatory human rights 
due diligence (mHRDD) obligations for companies in relation to their operations and 
supply chains. Numerous civil society groups are calling for such mHRDD 
obligations (Smit et al., 2020) in order to address serious labour exploitation and 
other adverse impacts on people by corporate activity. According to a quantitative 
research into enterprises of all sizes and representing all sectors commissioned by 
the European Commission (EC) DG Justice and Consumers (Smit et al., 2020a), 
even businesses themselves consider that mHRDD may provide legal certainty, a 
level playing field, and an increased leverage in their business relations through the 
supply chain by way of a non-negotiable standard. Not surprisingly, since the current 
situation clearly disadvantages companies that already fulfill HRDD through their 
supply chains in so far as it deprives them of equal opportunities for competition 
(Korn, 2020). The 2017 Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Act and the 2017 French 
Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law are examples of national HRDD laws already in 
force. In Switzerland and Norway HRDD legislative proposals are at advanced 
stage. The Finish and German governments announced such laws. The European 
Commission (EC) envisages proposing in 2021 EU-wide mHRDD legislation. It 
would aim at obliging businesses to act with due diligence in relation to the potential 
human rights and environmental impacts of their operations and supply chains. The 
announced measures are likely to be cross-sectoral and provide for sanctions in the 
event of non-compliance.3 This EC initiative fits into the global trend to embed 
corporate respect for human rights into different types of legal requirements (Cossart 
et al., 2017: 318). A question arises how this development came about? 
 
By its resolution no 17/4 of 16 June 2011, the UN Human Rights Council endorsed 
the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). The endorsement 
of the UNGPs spurred the global multi-stakeholder dialogue on business-related 
adverse impacts on people. The UN inspired negotiation process involves amongst 
others representatives of governments, businesses and civil society; policy 
contributions have also been formulated by the OECD (i.a. 2011, 2018)4, Council of 




eu-wide-mandatory-human-rights-due-diligence-law (21.07.2020). See also Krajewski & 
Faracik 2020. 
4OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 2011 Edition; OECD Due Diligence 
Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct, 2018. 
5Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)3 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on human 
rights and business of 2 March 2016; the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly’s 
Resolution 2311 (2019) and Recommendation 2166 (2019). 
6Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A renewed 
EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility COM(2011) 681 final; Commission 
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Under the UNGPs, business enterprises are expected to exercise human rights due 
diligence (HRDD). As explained by Prof. J. Ruggie, the main architect of the 
UNGPs, HRDD aims at “enabling the enterprise to discover whether and how it may 
become involved in human rights risks (forward looking) or is already involved in an 
adverse impact (present). Human rights due diligence includes using the information 
so gained to craft an appropriate response.” (Ruggie and Sherman 2017: 927). Still, 
as a soft-law document, UNGPs are not enforceable. Given strong resistance of 
international business lobby groups against the establishment of corporate 
accountability for adverse human impact7 (see e.g. Joint Statement on Business & 
Human Rights to the UN Human Rights Council by IOE, ICC and BIAC of 2011), 
the efforts to elaborate a legally binding instrument of international law may be of 
no avail. Or, even if adopted (second draft of the treaty was released in August 
2020), it might take decades to get it ratified and implemented. While in recent years 
a proliferation of private Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) standards and 
international soft-law instruments may be observed, to date, there is no binding 
international framework in place that addresses the conduct of companies in global 
supply chains (de Jonge, 2011). To some extent the OECD regime may be 
considered as such a framework, but applying only to its members and other states 
that voluntarily declare to be bound by the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and later OECD Due Diligence Guidance. Thus both documents are 
government-backed recommendations providing non-binding principles and 
standards for responsible business conduct in a global context. 
 
While first examples of mHRDD legislation were set by the Dutch8 and French9 due 
diligence laws or EU timber regulation10, some legislative measures sought to 
improve corporate human rights due diligence by means of transparency legislation 
(e.g. the UK 2015 Modern Slavery Act (MSA) and the EU 2014 Non-Financial 
 
Sector Guides on Implementing the UNGPs, 2013, https://ec.europa.eu/anti-
trafficking/publications/european-commission-sector-guides-implementing-un-guiding-
principles-business-and-hum-0_en (12.07.2020); European Parliament resolution of 4 
October 2018 on the EU’s input to a UN Binding Instrument on transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises with transnational characteristics with respect to human 
rights (2018/2763(RSP)). 
7 Joint Statement on Business & Human Rights to the UN Human Rights Council by the 
International Organisation of Employers (IOE), International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
and Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) to the OECD, 
https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2011/05/Joint-Statement-on-Business-Human-
Rights-to-the-United-Nations-Human-Rights-Council.pdf (12.08.2020).  
8 The Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Act, Kamerstukken I, 2016/17, 34 506, A. 
9 The French Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law, Loi no. 2017-399 du 27 Mars 2017 relative 
au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre. 
10 Regulation (EU) No 995/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
20 October 2010 laying down the obligations of operators who place timber and timber 
products on the market, European Union Official Journal L 295, 12.11.2010, p. 23–34. 
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Reporting Directive (NFRD)11). Literature points to various shortcomings of this 
legislative strategy (Le Baron and Rühmkorf 2017, 2019, indirectly in that sense also 
Broad & Turnbull 2019), deficiencies in the quality and usefulness of reporting 
(Smit et al., 2020; Mares, 2018, 21-22; Carrier and Bardwell, 2017, see also below) 
and failure to yield the expected effects in terms of influencing corporate behaviour 
(Mantouvalou, 2018; Le Baron and Rühmkorf, 2017; 2019). That is why in recent 
months there have been intensified developments across Europe to move from 
transparency legislation towards mHRDD legislation, including the announced plans 
by the European Commission to develop a respective legislative proposal by 2021. 
  
Against that backdrop, this paper attempts to provide some insights into mHRDD as 
a prospective new legal standard of care for companies operating on the EU Internal 
Market. Based on a desk-based review and analysis of the EU policy debate and 
other relevant scholarly and stakeholder contributions, the paper discusses possible 
options for mHRDD measures as well as their implications for the practice of 
corporate risk management. To that end, the paper first taps into examples of EU 
legislation in force that require due diligence of companies in relation to aspects 
other than human rights. A hypothesis is made that the modalities of enforcement of 
such legislation may usefully inform how the prospective HRDD obligations are best 
to be operationalized at the company level to ensure compliance. Subsequently 
modalities of mHRDD already in force at national and EU level are analysed and 
confronted with the EU policy debate and the consultation of stakeholders on 
HRDD. On that basis, options for EU-wide mHRDD measures are considered, as 
well as their possible consequences for corporate and supply chain governance. 
 
   2.   Industry-specific Perspectives on EU Corporate Due Diligence 
Standard 
 
In the EU law due diligence is a well-established standard of conduct expected from 
business enterprises operating within the EU Internal Market. What requirements 
such a standard must involve with respect to particular situations, industries and/ or 
operational contexts is laid down in many fields of EU legislation and further 
concretized in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). Hence, a corporate due diligence standard of conduct may not be put into 
any “universalized” formula. By way of example, under Article 13 of Directive 
2005/60/EC12 financial institutions are obliged to exercise customer due diligence 
which involves continuous vigilance over account activity of their customers in 
relation to the risks of money-laundering and financing terrorism. Article 2 (h) of the 
 
11Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 
amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity 
information by certain large undertakings and groups, OJ L 330, 15.11.2014, p. 1–9.   
12Directive 2005/60/EC of 26 October 2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial 
system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing, [2005] OJ L 309/15. 
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Unfair Commercial Practices Directive13 defines the concept of professional 
diligence as “the standard of special skill and care which a trader may reasonably be 
expected to exercise towards consumers, commensurate with honest market practice 
and/or the general principle of good faith in the trader’s field of activity”. CJEU 
specified that, within the meaning of the Directive, commercial practice can involve 
an isolated act of a professional which affected only one single consumer. Otherwise 
the onus of proving that other individuals have also been harmed by that same 
professional would rest on the consumer, who would very likely be incapable of 
providing such evidence.14 Furthermore, according to the settled CJEU case law it 
remains within the importer’s sphere of responsibility to make the necessary 
arrangements in his contractual relations to guard against the risks of an action for 
post-clearance recovery of import duties relating to the importation of goods from 
third countries into the EU territory.15 Pursuant to Article 220(2)(b) of the 
Community Customs Code16 the importer may effectively object to a post-clearance 
incurring of liability for import duties provided he can demonstrate that, during the 
period of the trading operations concerned, he has taken due care to ensure that all 
the conditions for the preferential status of the imported goods (i.e. either no or a 
reduced rate of import duties is levied on them) have been fulfilled. As part of their 
duty of care, importers are notably required to seek to obtain from the other 
contracting party all the necessary evidence confirming that the certificate of origin 
of the imported goods was correctly issued.17 For this duty it is immaterial that the 
importer is dependent on a chain of supply.18  
 
It follows from the foregoing that, as an expected standard of conduct for companies 
operating within the EU Internal Market, due diligence (or, depending on legislative 
rendition, due care, etc.) may and should be tailored to sector-specific and 
operational contexts. At the same time, it shares certain cross-sectorial features, such 
as the discharging of a legally imposed duty (compliance) and an exculpating 
function in respect of companies which can demonstrate a requisite standard of care. 
 
3.  The Experience of Mandatory Due Diligence Laws in Force 
 
 
13Directive 2005/29/EC of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial 
practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 
97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 (“Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive”) [2005] OJ L 149/22. 
14Case Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v UPC Magyarország kft, (C‑388/13) 
EU:C:2015:225, at 42 and 46. 
15 See e.g. Case Lagura Vermögensverwaltung (C‑438/11) EU:C:2012:703, at [30] or Order 
in CPL Imperial 2 and Unifrigo v Commission (C‑299/98 P) [1999] ECR I‑8683, at 38. 
16Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community 
Customs Code [1992] OJ L 302/1, as amended by Regulation (EC) No 2700/2000 of 16 
November 2000 [2000] OJ L 311/17. 
17 Lagura Vermögensverwaltung, at 31. 
18 Case Aqua Pro (C‑407/16) EU:C:2017:817. 
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The development of mHRDD legislation, both at EU and state level, is likely to 
draw on the experience of the CSR legislation already in force. Notably the 2017 
French Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law may be very influential due to its broad 
scope (it embraces human rights, health and safety of persons and the environment), 
as well as cross-sectorial character. The law establishes an obligation of vigilance for 
parent companies and companies having the power to instruct with regard to their 
subsidiaries, subcontractors and suppliers. Since the law was inspired by the UNGPs 
and OECD Guidelines19, the obligations relating to preparing and implementing a 
vigilance plan by companies are modeled on the HRDD process provided under the 
UNGPs (cf. Savourey, 2020: 56). When properly implemented, both the vigilance 
measures and HRDD process are thought to allow for identifying the risks and 
preventing severe impacts on human rights. Unlike HRDD under UNGPs, the 
French law extends the corporate duty of vigilance to possible environmental impact 
of its activity (Article L225-102-4 of the amended French Commercial Code, cf. also 
Brabant, Michon and Savourey 2017). The law initially provided for sanctions 
conceived as „civil fines” of up to 30 million Euro for non-compliance. However, 
the French constitutional Council found them unconstitutional on grounds of their 
being de facto of punitive character, while lacking sufficiently precise specification 
and previously enacted legal bases.20 This does not change the fact that, subject to a 
penalty, companies can still be ordered to comply with the duty to establish, publish 
and implement a vigilance plan. In addition, pursuant to Articles 1240 and 1241 of 
the amended French Civil Code, companies bear civil liability in cases where the 
non-compliance with the duty of vigilance has caused harm to the third party. In 
effect, for the establishment of company’s civil liability a direct causal link between 
that breach and the incurred losses needs to be demonstrated by the claimant. 
 
Clearly more restricted in scope, the 2017 Dutch Child Labour Due Diligence Act 
imposes on every company that supplies goods or services to Dutch end-users an 
obligation to conduct due diligence throughout the supply chain to find out whether 
the production of those goods and services to be supplied has involved child labour 
as well as to issue a declaration to that effect (Art. 4-5 of the Act). The fulfillment of 
the obligations is safeguarded by administrative and criminal (repeated non-
compliance) sanctions. Unlike the French Law which is not fully explicit as to 
whether the risk assessment under vigilance obligation refers only to the last tier 
(direct contractual partner) or to additional tiers down along the supply chain, the 
obligations imposed by the Dutch law cover the entire supply chain. Interestingly, 
though, the companies may discharge their due diligence obligations by purchasing 
the goods or services they intend to supply to Dutch end-users from companies that 
have issued a declaration with respect to those goods or services. The rationale 
behind this solution is the expectation that it will incentivize the last tier companies 
to deal only with lower tier companies that also live up to the obligations laid down 
 
19See the explanatory memorandum [exposé des motifs] of the draft law, 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/propositions/pion2578.asp, (accessed 26 July 2020). 
20 Decision of 23 March 2017, ECLI:FR:CC:2017:2017.750.DC. 
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in the Act, which will in practice have the effect of ‘pushing’ the Act’s obligations 
‘down’ the supply chain (Enneking, 2020: 176). 
 
Regarding the EU CSR legislation, the EU Conflict Minerals Regulation21 lays down 
supply chain due diligence obligations for EU importers of tin, tantalum and 
tungsten, their ores, and gold originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas. 
Article 16(3) thereof, which shall apply from 1 January 2021, stipulates that in the 
case of infringements on due diligence obligations laid down in the Regulation, 
Member State competent authorities shall issue a notice of remedial action to be 
taken by the EU importer. The scope of the said Regulation is, however, limited to a 
very specific sector of global supply chains. The same applies to the EU Timber 
Regulation (EUTR) aimed at countering trade in illegally harvested timber and 
timber products. Adopted prior to the endorsement of the UNGPs, it establishes an 
obligation to exercise due diligence for operators who place timber or timber 
products on the EU Internal Market. The due diligence under EUTR involves three 
elements: i) access to information concerning the operator’s supply of timber or 
timber products placed on the market, notably tree species and quantity, country of 
harvest, details of the supplier and information on compliance with national 
legislation; ii) risk assessment procedures enabling the operator to analyse and 
evaluate the risk of illegally harvested timber in his supply chain; iii) risk mitigation 
procedures involving requiring additional information and verification from the 
supplier where the risk assessment points at possible risk of illegal timber logging. 
Pursuant to Art. 10(5) of the Regulation, if shortcomings are detected in an 
operator’s compliance to his due diligence obligations, the competent authorities 
may issue a notice of remedial actions to be taken by that operator. Additionally, 
depending on the nature of the shortcomings detected, Member States may take 
immediate interim measures, including inter alia: i) seizure of timber and timber 
products; ii) prohibition of marketing of timber and timber products as well as 
impose other penalties, including fines (Art. 19). 
 
4.  Options for mHRDD Measures and their Operationalization 
 
In the light of increasing demand for fairly produced goods in Western countries, 
amidst lax enforcement of labour and environmental standards by governments of 
many export oriented economies (Fransen and Burgoon 2012), calls for broader 
(cross-sectorial and covering all human rights22 action have been intensified by civil 
society organizations, trade unions and even businesses. As pointed out by the 
aforementioned study on due diligence through the supply chain for the EC DG 
Justice and Consumers, 2020, legal certainty and the level playing field for all were 
amongst the most important considerations for business interviewees. The consulted 
stakeholders expressed an overall preference for a general cross-sectorial regulation, 
 
21 Regulation (EU) 2017/821 of 17 May 2017, [2017] OJ L 130/1. 
22 I.e. human rights as defined by international human rights treaties and accepted 
instruments such as ILO core standards.  
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as long as it provides for the specificities of the sector, and the size of the business 
enterprise in its application to specific cases. Stakeholders seemed also to agree that 
any regulatory mechanism should build upon the influence and strength of the 
UNGPs due diligence concept instead of any more “vague” solution. Not 
surprisingly, since the deficiencies in quality reporting under e.g. the 2015 UK 
Modern Slavery Act (Le Baron and Rühmkorf, 2017, 2019) and NFRD clearly 
suggest that the ultimate goal of such transparency legislation, i.e. the actual 
improvement of corporate human rights due diligence, has not been achieved. As a 
response to that state of affairs, the EU policy debate on CSR legislation evolves 
towards two basic trajectories: the intention to strengthen the provisions of the 
NFRD and developing a proposal for EU-legislation on mHRDD.  
 
The EC’s public consultation regarding a possible revision of the provisions of 
NFRD23 reveals that the lack of an obligation to disclose a minimum set of data (a 
common standard for reporting) in non-financial reporting under NFRD leads to 
incomparability of data between companies, or within the same company over the 
course of time and, in end effect, to limited usefulness of such information for 
investors, consumers and other potentially interested parties. Hence, it may be 
expected that the intended strengthening of the NFRD provisions will involve the 
introduction of such a common standard for reporting. 
 
As has been discussed under Section 3, transparency requirements are also typically 
incorporated into due diligence processes. Still, as a matter of principle, the 
obligations under the above discussed due diligence legislation regarding receiving 
access to, verifying and disclosing of relevant information are precisely specified, 
notably in view of non-compliance being subject to sanctions under those laws (cf. 
e.g. Art. 4, 7 and 16(1)(3) of the EU Conflict Minerals Directive). For reasons of 
legal certainty, firstly, any future EU-wide substantive HRDD obligations for 
business enterprises need to clearly define the required elements of the standard of 
corporate conduct, including that of disclosure obligations. 
 
Secondly, a question arises whether EU mHRDD measures should apply to all or 
only selected business enterprises. Due diligence legislation currently in force takes 
different approaches, which include as a point of reference: a specified annual 
import volume of the minerals or metals (EU Conflict Mineral Directive); a 
minimum number of employees for a specific period of time (the French law)24; the 
size of the company (measured according to a minimum turnover threshold (the UK 
Modern Slavery Act) and/ or annual balance sheet threshold), which additionally 
need to be cumulatively fulfilled with two additional premises: a particular legal 
form of the business entity, i.e. a public-interest company and minimum threshold of 
 
23https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12129-Revision-
of-Non-Financial-Reporting-Directive/public-consultation (accessed 30 July 2020). 
24 The law sets the thresholds at min. 5000 employees for two consecutive financial years, 
including company’s direct and indirect subsidiaries.  
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employees more than 500 employees (NFRD). These approaches share, however, a 
certain common denominator whereby it is correct to say that the laws apply to „big 
enterprises”. Yet, „size is never the only factor in determining the nature and scale of 
the processes necessary for an enterprise to manage its human rights risks. The 
severity and likelihood of its actual and potential human rights impact will be the 
more significant factor” (OHCHR, 2012: 20). Such factors determine an enterprise’s 
risk profile proportionate to which it needs to implement policies and processes for 
ensuring that it is not involved in such impacts (e.g. extractive sector in conflict 
areas, ibid.). These arguments speak in favour of the new EU mHRDD legislation 
applying to all business enterprises operating on the EU Internal Market, while the 
duties to discharge of mHRDD obligations could be differentiated in accordance 
with the enterprise’s risk factor, the complexity of its business structure, operational 
context relations and supply chains. 
 
Thirdly, the thrust of due diligence in existing corporate liability regimes, including 
in the EU context, is its exculpating function with respect to the defendant who can 
demonstrate a requisite standard of care25 (cf. e.g. B. Fasterling and G. Demuijnck, 
2013: 806-7; J. Bonnitcha and R. McCorquodale, 2017: 900). A similar approach is 
likely to be taken up by the expected EU mHRDD measures. In the European legal 
tradition a well-established principle of tort law allows for ascribing 
blameworthiness and thus also liability to a defendant who infringed on his 
obligation of the legal standard of care (due diligence). This approach is also 
adopted in the analysed due diligence laws under Section 3. 
 
Last but not least, it is believed that the new EU or state level CSR legislation would 
benefit from explicit provision that a company’s due diligence not only covers 
immediate (first-tier) contractual partners, but also extends to its potential influence 
over additional tiers of the supply chain (‘n-tier’ suppliers) (Krajewski & Faracik 
2020: 11). Given that instances in the CJEU's case law26 may be found where the 
Court extends a business operator’s risk liability beyond its immediate contractual 
partner, it may be assumed that mHRDD requiring risk assessment n-tier down the 
supply chain would be consistent with the current EU Internal Market principles. 
 
5.  Implications for the Corporate Risk Management Practice 
 
 
25This is not the function ascribed to due diligence by UNGPs, which link a company’s 
responsibility to its involvement with an adverse human rights impact. Thus the company’s 
responsibility and the obligation to remedy resulting from it arise whenever it causes, 
contributes to or is linked to negative human rights impact through its business activity or 
relationships. Establishing responsibility is linked to a harm suffered by an individual, 
whereas due diligence relates to the sphere of a business operator by which he can “know 
and show" that he respects human right. For discussion of this corporate accountability 
option, see Jędrzejowska-Schiffauer (2021, European Law Review, forthcoming). 
26 Aqua Pro (C‑407/16) EU:C:2017:817. 
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The above discussed options of new mHRDD obligations for business enterprises, if 
implemented, would have direct implications for the corporate risk management 
practice. The operationalization of such HRDD obligations at the company level 
would first of all require extending corporate risk management to monitoring 
possible negative human rights impact. „Human rights due diligence can be included 
within broader enterprise risk management systems, provided that it goes beyond 
simply identifying and managing material risks to the corporation itself, to include 
risks to rights-holders” (UNGPs, Commentary to GP 17). This effect could be 
safeguarded provided appropriate consultation with stakeholders, representative 
trade unions and workers’ representatives is conducted by the company prior to and 
during any major business activity (cf. ECCJ, 2020). 
 
Human rights risk assessment and management constitutes the core of substantive 
HRDD obligations and standards. By way of example, the new EU Conflict 
Minerals Regulation defines supply chain due diligence as the obligation of the EU 
importers „in relation to their management systems, risk management, independent 
third-party audits and disclosure of information with a view to identifying and 
addressing actual and potential risks linked to conflict-affected and high-risk areas to 
prevent or mitigate adverse impacts associated with their sourcing activities”. As 
pointed out above, it may be useful for businesses to employ tools they already use 
within other processes such as risk assessments or environmental and social impact 
assessments for the purpose of assessing possible or actual human rights impacts. On 
condition, however, that all internationally recognised human rights will be involved 
as a point of reference ((UNGPs, Commentary to GP 18). To be accurate, human 
rights impact assessment (HRIA) is to be carried out „at regular intervals: prior to a 
new activity or relationship; prior to major decisions or changes in the operation 
(e.g. market entry, product launch, policy change, or wider changes to the business); 
in response to or anticipation of changes in the operating environment (e.g. rising 
social tensions); and periodically throughout the life of an activity or relationship” 
(ibid). As argued above, HRIA must account for legitimate concerns of potentially 
affected right-holders, preferably by direct consultation with them or, in case of 
barriers to their effective involvement, by consulting independent experts from civil 
society engaged in human rights protection.  
 
Evidence may also be provided to the effect that the achievement of sustainable 
development goals requires that a business enterprise takes on shared responsibility 
for the whole (n-tier) supply chain, with business relationships constituting an 
important factor affecting the company’s ability to create and manage a sustainable 
supply chain (Rudnicka 2018). For instance, pursuant to Art. 5(1)(b) of the EU 
CMR, enterprises are obliged to respond to the identified risks by adopting risk 
management measures, including exerting pressure on suppliers who can most 
effectively prevent or mitigate the identified risk. The leverage may involve: i) 
continuing trade while simultaneously implementing measurable risk mitigation 
efforts, ii) suspending trade temporarily while pursuing ongoing measurable risk 
mitigation efforts, or iii) disengaging with a supplier after failed attempts at risk 
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mitigation. In this context, compliance with the due diligence standard also involves 
access to and keeping record of adequate documentation, notably maintaining a 
written record of all due diligence actions and their results (cf. e.g. ECCJ, 2020).  
 
Feasibility of shared responsibility within the supply chain depends on economic 
characteristics of a company’s position in the production chain. It may also be 
difficult where enterprises have large numbers of entities in their supply chains. 
Identifying high-profile risk areas and conducting HRDD across them could be 
potentially a way forward (cf. UNGPs, Com. GP 17). As exemplified by the EU 
CMR, the ‘supply chain due diligence scheme’ may easily be adapted and applied 
for that purpose as it builds upon a combination of voluntary supply chain due 
diligence procedures, tools and mechanisms, including independent third-party 
audits. It means that business enterprises will and should have enough room to 
prioritise their primary incentives for undertaking HRDD, such as: i) reputational 
risks; ii) investors requiring a high corporate due diligence standard; iii) consumers 
requiring a high standard (Smit et al. 2020, cf. also Fransen and Burgoon 2012); iv) 
sanctions for non-compliance or v) risk of litigation in court. The risk that a court 
holds a company liable for damages on the grounds of not having fulfillled HRDD 
obligations despite its reasonable efforts to comply with them, could possibly be 
covered by voluntary insurance schemes. 
 
    6.   Conclusions 
 
Upcoming mHRDD legislation may reasonably be expected to appropriately define 
the effects to be achieved by HRDD measures that any enterprise involved in 
transnational supply chains would need to implement. The modalities of 
implementation may, however, be differentiated in accordance with the enterprises’ 
risk profiles. Corporate risk management would therefore be well advised, on the 
one hand, to adapt its existing tools to the task of assessing the risk of adverse 
human rights impact caused by the activities of the enterprise.  
 
On the other hand, it is in the enterprise’s own interest to provide constructive input 
into the upcoming legislative procedures, so as to point out the specificities of the 
business branches and to suggest best practices for implementing HRDD. While 
aiming at legal certainty the upcoming legislation will inevitably leave „grey areas” 
(Grabosch 2015) where - in case of dispute - the proper fulfillment of the HRDD 
obligations may only be determined in court. Compliance-oriented risk management 
accounting solely for the risks to the company may thus prove insufficient regarding 
HRDD and eventually lead to liability.  
 
The arguments advanced and distinctions proposed in this paper could usefully be 
deepened by theoretical and empirical research, including qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of companies operating on the EU Internal Market and sourcing 
products from developing countries.  
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